Syracuse Scholar (1979-1991)
Volume 2
Issue 2 Syracuse Scholar Fall 1981

Article 5

1981

Aggression and Culture: A Psychoanalytic Perspective
Peter Gay

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar

Recommended Citation
Gay, Peter (1981) "Aggression and Culture: A Psychoanalytic Perspective," Syracuse Scholar (1979-1991):
Vol. 2 : Iss. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol2/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Syracuse
Scholar (1979-1991) by an authorized editor of SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu.

Gay: Aggression and Culture: A Psychoanalytic Perspective

Aggression and
Culture:
A Psychoanalytic Perspective

Peter Gay

I

Photo by J.D. Levine/Yale University
Professor Gay's article is taken from a
talk presented at Syracuse University in
October 1979 as part of the symposium "A Study of Culture .."
Peter Gay was born in Berlin in 1923
and came to the United States in
1941. He received his doctorate from
Columbia and now teaches at Yale,
where he is Durfee Professor of
History. Dr. Gay has written widely in
intellectual and cultural history. For
the last five years he has been attempting to combine psychoanalytic and
historical studies. Among. his many
books are Style in History ( 1974); Art
and Act: On Causes in
History-Manet, Gropius, Mondrian
(1976); and rreud, jews and Other
Germans: Masters and Victims in
Modernist Culture (1978).

Published by SURFACE, 1981

want to speak to you of two cultures in a very particular way:
as the confrontation of mind with itself. I need not rehearse the central position that Sigmund Freud occupies in
modern culture; rather I want to return to Freud's theory of human
narure. It is a complicated and above all an unfinished theory, with insights that we have all made our own, but it is also riddled with
obscurities that we have not yet fully confronted.
Among these obscurities, perhaps the most consequential and the
one most in need of light is Freud's theory of instincts-better, the
drives-which straddle the. borders of biology, physiology, and
psychology and which are the indispensable fuel for all human action.
Among the great drives, sexuality and aggression principally engrossed
Freud's attention. In the first version of his system, he did not yet
visualize these drives in the clear-cut opposition that he later
presented in his revision of the early 1920s. But once he had abandoned his scheme of ego instincts and sexual instincts-the one driving
towards the preservation of the self, the other towards that of the
species-he came to see the instincts in stark confrontation: sexuality
against aggression, love against hate, and, more dramatically and
decisively, life against death.
For all the canny observations and brilliant theorizing by Freud and
his followers, the sexual drive is by no means a completely open or
easily legible book. But aggression has been far less thoroughly explored than has sexuality. We know in general outlines what the sexual drive is and how it manifests itself; we have learned to understand
its progression through stages and its vulnerability to injury, its capacity for concealment and its pressure for expression. With aggression we
are on more shifting ground. To begin with, aggression, unlike sexuality, has no clearly defined or localized executive organ-nor, for
that matter, does it have the kind of timetable that Freud assigned to
the growth of the erotic experience and to the appropriate stages of
anxiety. What is more, for all the flexibility of the sexual drive, all the
ease with which one object, whether real or fantasized, can be
substituted for another, it has a kind of emphatic single-mindedness
that aggression does not share. Beyond that, the origins of aggressive
1
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impulses are, unlike the sexual ones, hard to detect and specify. We
have no difficulty recognizing erotic feelings as autonomous, as
generated within the self. But are aggressive feelings autonomous or
derived, originators or responses?
These are intractable questions. They are not settled by Freud's
most emphatic embodiment of his majestic pair, Eros and Thanatos;
for Freud's exposition of that pair is far from wholly persuasive. To
read Beyond the Pleasure Pn'nciple, where Freud first spells out the
theory of instincts to which he would remain committed for the rest of
his life, is to experience doubts and, at least for this reader, even irritation . In comparison, Freud's magisterial earlier Three Essays on the
Theory of Sexuality carry conviction and invite unforced assent on
every page. The reasons for this difference in response are worth considering for a moment. Generally, even in his theoretical writings,
Freud was soaked in clinical experience. The cases on which he drew in
most of his work are highly visible or lurk just beneath the surface, giving his argumentation a reassuring solidity and extraordinary power of
persuasion. But when he postulates the death instinct, speculation
freely indulged and frankly conceded holds the reins. What moved
Freud here was a dramatic, seductive, but to my mind inadequate
combination of observation and the unproved and abstruse theorizing
of a few biologists-to say nothing of his own need for a dualistic
theory of human nature. This was necessary for Freud in part because
he wanted to avoid any identification with the psychologies of Jung
and Adler; and in part because, on his own candid admission, ~e had
a need for confrontation, which lay deeply concealed within his mental makeup. Indeed, there are distinguished psychoanalysts, most
notably Otto Fenichel, who have denied the existence of a death instinct.
To deny such an instinct is not to deny the existence of a basic drive
of aggression-of a cluster of impulses directed against objects, including oneself, arising independently of experience though certainly
shaped by it. This solution, which rejects Freud's extreme formulations while retaining powerful elements of his dualistic scheme, has
been adopted by most psychoanalysts; though there are also those,
good Freudians all, who have trouble with the very idea of independent agression as well.

D

oes the status of aggression matter outside the analyst's consulting room or the metapsychologist's study? Does it matter
to a symposium on culture-or .two cultures? It does. Certainly the ethologists,· anthropologists, and psychoanalysts who have
debated the question need no demonstration of the importance of
defining and locating aggression, and I think they are right. What has
been involved for them is nothing less than the desperate question of
war and peace . If aggression is simply a response to external circumstances-particularly to frustration that has been imposed or pain
that has been inflicted- then statemen and educators might hope to
avert war by a series of remedies in the social, economic, political,
perhaps religious, and certainly psychological domains. If, though, aggression is inborn, if it is as much a part of the equipment of the
human being as the gift for speech and the need for food, then the
ultimate explosion that will destroy us all appears, if not inevitable, at
least highly likely. Let me observe at the outset that this conclusion
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does not necessarily follow. It certainly did not necessarily follow for
Freud. In his famous brief correspondence with Einstein, published as
"Why War?" Freud held to his theory of aggression, indeed of the
death instinct, without committing himself to the inevitability of armed conflict. In the early 1930s he thought, as he had before, that the
balance of terror-men's awareness, however inchoate, that they
might destroy all of mankind-could check the drift to war. Indeed,
in the famous last paragraph of his Civilization and Its Discontents
(that essay of Freud's which is a favorite among those who are not
themselves psychoanalysts) Freud depicted the contest between life
and death as a dramatic struggle whose outcome was by no means certain: "Now it is to be expected ... that eternal Eros will make an effort
to assert himself in the struggle with his equally immortal adversary.
But who can foresee with what success and with what result?" 1 We
know that this skeptical, grim concluding question was added in 1931.
And yet Freud, a man who fought illusions in himself and in others,
did not believe that the death instinct must result in war. It is worth
noting that for another acute psychologist, William James, the
postulate of an innate inclination to pugnacity did not in itself
guarantee the inevitability of war. In his much-quoted essay "On the
Moral Equivalent of War," James put it in his usual vigorous way:
''The fatalistic view of the war-function is to me nonsense, for I know
that war-making is due to definite motives and subject to prudential
checks and reasonable criticisms, just like any other form of
enterprise." 2 And he believed, of course , that one might discover
some moral equivalent of war that would absorb man's warlike instincts and lead him to higher goals.
It cannot be my intention to minimize the importance of such
reflections. The preservation of world peace is the presupposition of
culture as we know it-even of the two cultures, the scientific and the
humane, of which we have heard so much. But the intellectual problem raised by Freud's theory of aggression is far more difficult and,
though more abstract, far more complicated than the vexed question
of whether human nature can permit mankind even to dream of
perpetual peace. The agencies that spread the news of the world before
us at our breakfast tables offer daily, depressing testimony how deeply
some men hate other men-unto death; and how ready they are, even
eager, to destroy those who disagree with them or who happen to be,
quite innocently, in a certain spot when a bomb explodes. The
pleasure inherent in such exercises of violence, this lust for destruction, is only too palpable. Recently (ifl may interject another observation here) I came upon an arresting article about the Dalai Lama that
provided me with a welcome text for this theme. Religion , said the
Dalai Lama, is a tool to help us control our minds; the aim is to
transform self-destructive thoughts such as anger, jealousy, and hatred
into their opposites. But can we? That is the question.

1. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its
Discontents, in The Standard Edition
of the Complete Psychological Works
of Sigmund Freud, trans. James
Strachey et al., 24 vols. (London:
Hogarth Press and Institute of
Psychoanalysis, 1953-74), 21 :145 .

2. William James, " On the Moral
Equivalent of War," in Memones and
Studtes (New York: Longmans, Green,
1911).

I

want to move from this particular and very important question
to the role that we can expect aggression to play in the human
economy. Let me launch my inquiry, in the manner of the
psychoanalyst, with four vignettes. The psychoanalyst and the
historian have much in common in methods and intention, and they
markedly share a passion for concreteness. The individual experience,
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the unique event, are raw materials for both. Here is some raw
material for our thought:

3. Jerome K. Jerome, Three Men on the
Bummel (Bristol, Eng.: Arrowsmith,
1900), pp . 286-292.

Vignette 1. In 1900 the English journalist and playwright Jerome K.
Jerome, whose specialty was a peculiar blend of sentimentality and
jocularity, of homely philosophizing and hilarious invention, published a book called Three Men on the Bumme/.3 It was a fanciful,
lighthearted account of a bicycle tour through Germany by several
young Englishmen, who had achieved a certain national prominence
with an earlier vacation trip-that one up the Thames-immortalized
by the author in his Three Men in a Boat. The Rummel is filled with
comical adventures and pleasant if somewhat acidulous animadversions on German lawfulness and pedantry. But there are graver
moments, and one of them, described in some detail by the narrator,
concerns a traditional students' duel, the Mensur.
The Germans, Jerome tell us, "have come to persuade themselves
there is no brutality in it" ; rather, it "schools the German youth to
coolness and courage." Jerome will have none of this: "All the Mensur does is to brutalize him.'' Then, warning his readers that what
follows will not be pretty, Jerome gives a vivid account:
"The room," he begins, "is bare and sordid; its walls splashed with
mixed stains of beer, blood, and candle-grease." The combatants,
swaddled and padded, fight rapidly and dully; "there is no movement, no skill, no grace." Quite simply, "the strongest man wins."
But the battle itself does not really matter. ''The whole interest is
centered in watching the wounds. They come always in one of two
places-on the top of the head or the left side of the face. Sometimes a
portion of the hairy scalp or section of cheek flies up into the air, to be
carefully preserved in an envelope by its proud possessor, or, strictly
speaking, its proud former possessor, and shown round on convivial
evenings." There is naturally much blood. "It splashes doctors,
seconds, and spectators; it sprinkles ceilings and walls; it saturates the
fighters, and makes pools for itself in the sawdust.'' The effects are at
times grotesque. "Now and then you see a man's teeth laid bare
almost to the ear, so that for the rest of the duel he appears to be grinning at one half of the spectators , his other side remaining serious.''
But the duel itself, Jerome notes, "is only the beginning of the
fun." What happens afterwards, when the wounds are dressed, matters quite as much. The dueling student wants to retain his scars all his
life; hence he welcomes the kind of clumsy patching up that the socalled doctors, who are really medical students, will give him. In the
dressing room he is on trial. "How the student bears the dressing of
his wounds is as important as how he receives them. ''
Reflecting on this revolting theme, Jerome emphatically asserts that
nothing at all ''can properly be said in favor of the German Men sur. ' '
And on the spectators the sight is "evil." He then candidly analyzes
his own response to this most un-English, most Teutonic barbarity: "I
know myself sufficiently well to be sure I am not of an unusually
bloodthirsty disposition." At the outset he felt merely "curiosity
mingled with anxiety." Then, "as the blood began to flow, and
nerves and muscles to be laid bare, I experienced a mingling of disgust
and pity." But then, "with the second duel, my finer feelings began
to disappear; and by the time the third was well upon its way, and the
room heavy with the curious hot odor of blood, I began, as the
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American says, to see things red. I wanted more ."
Vignette 2. No one perhaps is more popular as a German humorist
than Wilhelm Busch. He began his career as an occasional draftsman
and composer of jokes in German humor magazines. In his first and
still most famous tale, Max und Moritz, published in 1865, he took
two bad boys through seven naughty, even vicious, pranks to an untimely (or perhaps timely) end. He drew as well as he rhymed, and
after his death in 1908 he received the accolade of being considered
something of a philosopher. There are doctoral dissertations about his
philosophy-in Germany. In many of his jokes and rhymed stories,
Busch exercised a great deal of aggression against his characters, puncturing their cheeks, noses, ears, and buttocks with sharp nails,
fishhooks, and specially sharpened pencils. Some of his characters lose
a nose or an ear without anyone looking twice . But the particular story
to which I want to call attention is his ''Monsieur Jacques Paris,''
prompted by the German siege of Paris late in 1870. Its protagonist is
a starving French patriot, reduced to smoking the seaweed from his
mattress and to eating a captured mouse, his once cherished canary,
and then his dog's tail, which, unfortunately for the dog, reminds him
of the ' 'shape that one used to call a sausage. ' ' All of this is drawn, to
be sure, in black and white-but most graphically, leaving out no horrendous detail. As the Prussians approach, M. Jacques invents explosive pills that he tries out on the dog, with, as Busch coolly puts it,
"favorable results"; which is to say, the dog is blown to bits. Encouraged by this successful experiment, M. Jacques loads cutlets for
Prussians; but since they are eaten instead by two starving Parisians,
who promptly explode, M. Jacques despairs of his cause, loads his
boots with his pills, and blows himself up .
Vignette 3. In December 1831 Honore Daumier published a cartoon, a lithograph entitled Gargantua, for that great radical journalist
and publisher Philipon. It was a savage comment on King Louis
Philippe's cynical and rampant favoritism . In a chair, which it soon
becomes evident is a chaise perc!e, there sits a hugely swollen figure
with a pear-shaped head that had already been identified by Philipon
and Daumier as the head of the king. There he sits with his mouth
open, swallowing loads of gold pieces that are carried up on a long
ramp by heavily laden lackeys and gathered, as one can see at the bottom of that ramp, from the poor, the wretched, the aged, the crippled . And all too obviously the king is digesting the gold and convening it, as it drops from his body, into medals, patents of nobility, and
money. On the left, just to make the picture understandable, is the
Royal Exchange. On the right, in the background, we can see Versailles.
The cartoon was clearly a collaboration because this kind of frank
scatology is rare in Daumier; nor did Daumier very often turn to
literature, as here to Rabelais, for his allusions. In his journal La
Caricature, Philipon spoke with great frankness of this cartoon, which
was published independently; and in case anyone missed the point, he
summed up its message: "M. Gargantua is an enormous fellow who
swallows and easily digests a natural budget, which he promptly
transforms into very good smelling secretions at Court, crosses, ribbons, brevets, etc.'' With this kind of mock horror that humorists who
get into politics often display, Philipon denied that Gargantua should

a
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4. Ernst Kris et al., ed . and trans. ,
The Origins of Psychoanalysis: Sigmund Freud's Letters to Fliess (New
York, 1954), p . 215.

be taken for Louis Philippe. The cartoon figure, he wrote, lacks those
features of "frankness, liberality, and nobility which so eminently
distinguish Louis Philippe from all other living kings,'' and he warned
that the seizure of the cartoon, which occurred promptly, would only
make people see resemblances that were not there. It is a familiar
technique: confirmation by denial. It did not save either Philipon or
Daumier from jail and the hefty fine of 500 francs plus costs.
Vignette 4. Beginning in the early 1890s, and fruitfully collaborating with his friend Josef Breuer, Sigmund Freud inched his way
toward what were to become the epoch-making discoveries of
psychoanalysis-year by year, I am tempted to say, patient by patient.
With Breuer, but increasingy working on his own, by the mid-nineties
he had become a great expert in a variety of neurotic ailments, most
notably hysteria. In 1895 he and Breuer, in a joint publication, claimed that hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences. Listening to his patients-for he was a great listener-he heard one after the other telling
horrendous tales of infantile seductions. Most of his hysterical patients
were women, and most of these seemed to remember that they had
been seduced in childhood by their fathers. This theory helped to confirm Freud's conjecture that psychological maladies had sexual origins.
But as he listened, as he examined himself, and as he absorbed the
work of some other specialists in the relation of sex to illness, he found
that his cherished theory, that hysteria is the consequence of infantile
seduction by the father, could not stand. It was, in a word, incredible.
One must remember that Freud was an ambitious man, who had
barely missed fame more than once and who was now once again compelled to surrender a favorite theory under the pressure of contrary
evidence. On September 21, 1897, Freud, who had just returned from
a summer vacation "refreshed, cheerful, impoverished," burst out to
his sole confidant Wilhelm Fleiss: ''And now right off I want to confide to you the great secret that has been slowly dawning on me in the
last few months.' ' He no longer believed, he said, in those stories of
infantile seduction.4 And he added in some discouragement that he
no longer knew where he stood. Later, looking back at the collapse of
his erroneous theory, he thought that this moment had been almost
fatal to his young science. But when one studies the evidence of that
fall of 1897, a much more positive result emerges. Freud thought, as
he later put it, that he must pull himself together, out of a depression.
He did so with remarkable rapidity. He attacked his problem, that of
the false theory, not by mourning it but rather by drawing from it
fruitful theoretical conclusions. If these seduction stories were not
true, they had certainly been reported to him freely and insistently.
And it was this fact-this insistent unconscious fabrication-that gave
Freud access to the role of fantasy in the human mind. He did not , as
he wrote at the time, feel disgraced but felt "a sense more of victory
than of defeat." It was this victory, this triumph over the enemies of
error and uncertainty, that characterized Freud all that fall of 1897. By
October 3 he could tell his friend that ''the last four days of my selfanalysis, which I consider indispensable for clearing up the whole
problem, have been progressing in dreams and yielding me most
valuable disclosures and clues.' ' It was at this point that he
remembered once seeing his mother naked; and by October 15 he said
that he had finally grasped "the gripping power of King Oedipus."
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Here was triumph indeed : he had attacked his problem and he had
resolved it.

H

ere then we have a budget of human actions and feelings of
striking diversity. What these four vignettes have in com.
mon is, first, that all record a yield of pleasure. To watch the
bloody duel, draw a gloating sketch, devise the offensive cartoon, consummate years of arduous labor, increases the sum of happiness .
"Hatred," the German psychoanalyst Alexander Mitscherlich has
written, "does not gratify. "5It would seem that hatred does little else
but gratify.
The second quality that unites these four vignettes is that they are
all a kind of attack: most palpably with Daumier and Busch and only
less so with Jerome and Freud. Jerome, too, is moved to attack by the
bloody spectacle before him. We can practically enter his fantasy, in
which he moves from being a spectator to being an actor, with
himself,Jerome K.Jerome, wielding the razor-sharp saber. Freud's attack is more indirect, but it is more than metaphorical. Quite properly, in English, one meaning of "attack" is to wield an instrument, including a paintbrush or a violin bow, and set to work. It is interesting
to note in this connection that the German verb and noun for
"attack" are angreifen, and Angriff The German comes close to
reviving the derivation of the English word, which comes from attachment. The German visibly embodies the notion of seizing, of grabbing hold of something with no necessary admixture of anger or
hostility. Freud's sense of mastery, especially as revealed in his rapid
recovery from the depression that his disconcening discovery had caused him, bore the triumphant air of the conqueror as he looks upon the
land and its king that he has subdued . Freud's famous description of
himself as a conquistador only confirms our sense of him as the bold
and confident attacker on the intractable problems of the mind. What
distinguishes Freud's sense of triumph from that of the others is that it
appears to be free from rage.
I suggest that it is this conjunction of pleasure and attack that holds
these four heterogeneous experiences together and gives some
substance to Freud's notion that the derivatives of what he persisted in
calling the "death instinct" included "the destructive instinct, the instinct for mastery, or the will to power. 6"
I should argue that both pleasure and attack in some amalgam are
necessary before aggression is fully at work. Pleasure without attack-the simple gratification of needs clearly felt and quickly offered-stands under the sign of Eros, or of sheer reflex action. Attack
without pleasure seems almost impossible to conceive; only an attack
that continuously and hopelessly fails can claim this pure state. The
pleasure in attack may be less than triumphant; it may stem from the
relief that action after passivity may bring; this, of course, is one of the
pleasures of play. It may lie in the sheer reduction of tension, or in its
increase, for Freud was right to note that the former alone did not
engross all pleasurable sensation. Mounting sexual excitement, for
one, is pleasurable in itself, even if the ultimate state, after orgasm,
brings another pleasure, the momentary extinction of need. In the
same way, aggressive activity may produce the reward of heightened
alenness and of the exercise of all one's mental or physical resources.
Attack-it need not derive from hate-is always a pleasure, especially
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5. Alexander Mitscherlich, quoted in
K.R . Eissler, "Death Drive, Ambivalence, and Narcissism,"
Psychoanalytic Study of the Chzld 26
(1972) : 72.

6. Sigmund Freud, " The Economic Problem of Masochism,'' Standard Edition,
19:163.
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after the fact.

N

7. Lyman Beecher, Autobiography, ed.
Barbara Cross, 2 vols. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, Belknap
Press, 1961), 1:88.

othing is easier than to demonstrate the aggressive component in the varied activities my vignettes have illustrated,
or in activities allied to them. Sport, presumably the
civilized counterpart of the Mensur, is an excellent case in point.
Player and spectator alike are engaged in an agonistic enterprise, and it
is the agonistic element that brings the pleasure of aggression,
Psychoanalysis compels us to turn the old saw about sportsmanship on
its head and say, ''It is not how you play the game but whether you
win or lose that matters.'' This is what Vince Lombardi meant when
he said, "Winning is not the main thing; it is the only thing." There
are exceptions to this; runners or soccer players who enjoy the play of
muscles, the sheer competence of the perfect pass or well-timed sprint
for its own sake; and there are spectators of certain sports, like cricket
or gymnastics or figure skating, who are connoisseurs of form, whether
displayed by one's "own" players or by the opposition. Such players
and spectators have largely inhibited their aggressive impulses to give
preeminence to a tamer, highly sublimated form of aggression that is
joy in mastery.
In thinking of sport as combat, which gratifies or frustrates aggressive wishes, I have spoken of active and passive participants in one
breath. That was deliberate; anyone who has ever played and watched
play can testify that the emotions in both activities are, if not the
same, then strikingly allied. The player commits aggression; the spectator, if I may so put it, practices identification with the aggression.
Lyman Beecher, in his autobiography, records such an identification
after watching a whale hunt. Let his testimony stand for an army of
possible witnesses: "Once we came near the whale, 'Pull! Pull!!
Pull!!!' and the harpooneer stood in the bow, almost near enough-!
saw over my shoulder a boiling pot a little ahead. I longed he should
strike the whale.'' 7 The mounting orgastic excitement of aggressive
identification, marked by the increased number of exclamation points
after that curt command "Pull!" has rarely been better conveyed.
Humor needs, if anything, less justification than do sports to be
ranged among acts of aggression. Humor, too, is agonistic much of the
time, though there is also some purely verbal humor. Puns or
nonsense rhymes, which principally serve as rehearsals for competence
(especially with children) or as permission to dwell on otherwise forbidden sexual topics, cannot be identified with aggession. But much
wit or humor is aggressive and thus offers material for an interesting
sociological study. One may, as it were, exercise one's wit inward
(against oneself), downward (against helpless adversaries), outward
(against strangers), and upward (against the powerful). This last is
doubtless the most courageous-one can measure that courage in the
career of Daumier-but it is not the only psychologically interesting
direction. All genres of humor, brave or craven, take pleasure in
reducing an enemy. That pleasure is an intimate one, closely related to
important activities and important parts of the body, as the adjectives
for the most aggressive wit disclose (e.g., epithets like biting or cutting). And the attacking potential of scatological humor, of which
Daumier' s cartoon of Louis Philippe on a chaise percee is a splendid
exemplar, is obviously great.
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ll that I have been saying should help to demonstrate the
prominence in social life of aggression, a counterpart to
sexuality in that it appears both as open or aim-inhibited,
as direct or sublimated. But nothing I have said so far demonstrates
that aggression originates as a drive. The familiar scenario, which
psychologists up to and including Freud drew up, was to treat aggression as a response, a secondary kind of action aroused by and designed
to counteract frustration. Now clearly frustration by itself, as Karl
Menninger pointed out long ago, cannot account for this aggressive
response, since injuries have the same effect as frustration in arousing
aggression.s As Menninger said, anyone who has had his toe stepped
on, which is certainly not a frustration, knows the inadequacy of the
formula that ascribes an aggressive response to frustration alone.
But the flexible psychologist might adjust this formula, retaining
the idea that aggression is a response, by adding pain to frustration as
the originating agent. Aggression, on this showing, is principally
counteraggression, a vigorous, perhaps an excessive defense. The picture is plausible and, certainly to some extent, accurate. We have all
seen children strike out angrily at beloved parents who have denied
them a wish. The chain of aggression is a familiar one: the employee
who has been reprimanded by his boss being "causelessly" irritable
with his wife, who, respectful to her husband, kicks the cat for no apparent reason. Aggression, especially of a kind that is demonstrably irrational, seems plainly to be a form of revenge, an attempt to undo a
frustration, or to repair some earlier, often repressed, narcissistic injury. Like so much else in life, aggression is overdetermined. Busch's
German chauvinism was in part a conscious policy of riding a wave of
popularity; this kind of anti-French humor was an easy triumph over
the victim. But part of Busch's triumph was also his sheer pleasure in
the exercise of his wicked talent. What is so striking about this kind of
aggression is its failure of proportion. The fantasied or actual punishment does far more than fit the crime. Most advocates of the death
penalty persist in the face of persuasive evidence that it is not a deterrent and hence scarcely a utilitarian social policy; similarly, crusaders
against social and sexual deviance often ignore demonstrations that
such deviance does no measurable harm to society. It is reasonable to
conjecture, then, that they are loosing their aggression for reasons that
are to them rational defense-but only to them. Revenge is sweet, says
the poet. Attack, once again, gives pleasure.
It is this disproportion between presumed cause and actual effect
that strengthens the argument that human aggression is something
more than a mere response to untoward impinging events. It may
seem-to us-reasonable to ward off further injury after an injury has
been inflicted; it may seem equally reasonable to try to undo frustrations. For both are sources of unpleasure, and man is a pleasureseeking animal. But we must still ask, Where does the impulse to resist
injury and resent frustration come from?9 What is more, why does it so
easily lapse into this unmeasured rage to injur, to kill, to devour?

8. Karl Menninger, Love against Hate
(New York: Harcourt, Brace , 1942), p.
295.

9. Ibid.

T

here is one obvious question that must surely accompany the
reader's examination of my reflections: why is there such
difficulty in specifying the nature of aggression? I have
already mentioned some of the reasons, such as the absence of
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specialized executive organs. There is yet one more reason: aggression
is almost never a pure culture. Just as sexuality is usually intermingled
with aggression , as Freud noted in his Three Essays, so aggression contains a sexual component, and it is often impossible to disentangle one
from the other. Aggression derives some of its energy, and much of its
pleasure, from Eros.
With these considerations, I am ready to return to the question that
has divided and is dividing the scholars : is aggression innate or acquired? The issue, as I have hinted, is politically sensitive: the
ethologist Karl Lorenz has even been suspected of finding aggression
to be a univers~l trait for the sake of apologizing for German barbarity. This will not get us far . I would suggest, tentatively, a way out. Tl~e
dichotomy of nature versus nurture is, I think, a mistaken construction. I am confident that the question can never be conclusively settled
because very early interactions and experiences cover the initial
manifestations of aggression like a set of heavy blankets. The infant
who turns its head away from the breast is already expressing an
overdetermined complex of emotions. I think that we must therefore
regard aggression neither as wholly innate nor as simply a reflex. I
would suggest that we look upon native energies as undifferentiated,
beginning with a cluster of innate drives, which are at first sexual and
aggressive together. Aggression then begins to segregate itself painfully from the sexual drives, to be shaped through a series of specific experiences. Mastery, sadism, the urge to control or bite, all sort
themselves out in time through culture. To live is to sustain injuries
and frustrations, and it is important to remember that not all frustrations, not all injuries, come from the outside world: the very process of
surviving involves the selection and the repression of a number of
wishes, including aggressive wishes. We cannot live without them, but
we can never wholly live with all of them.
If this proposal points in the right direction, as I think it does, we
must acknowledge that in some way or other the civil war between the
two cultures we carry within ourselves will be continued always. This
view is sustained by the implications we must draw from Sigmund
Freud's structural theory, according to which the three elemental institutions of the mind-the id, the ego, and the superego-at best live
together in a patched-up, strictly temporary truce. Each of these institutions, though it often necessarily collaborates with its friendly
enemies, has ultimately aims and wishes at cross purposes with the
other two. Aggression in some form we will always have with us, and
not all of it will be adaptive . But none of this is cause for despair; it is
cause, rather, for vigilance. To think of aggression as a mere response
is to invite utopianism. To think of aggression as a fixed drive is to invite depression. The proposal that I have offered is more than a compromise; it is, I think, in accord with the evidence. And once we
understand what we as human beings must confront, once we bring
light to this obscurity, we may deal with it less helplessly than we have
so far . We may even muster some humor-unaggressive humor-to
our task and conclude with Pogo: "We have met the enemy, and he
is us."
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